conflict to American hegemony while others have stressed the positive role that regional institutions play in promoting cooperation. 3 Yet others have pointed to the growth of economic linkages. 4 This piece considers the promise of economics to calm or lubricate a settlement of the Japan-South Korea Dokdo issue. It does this by thoroughly examining two APR territorial and maritime disputes. One is the China-Japan controversy over the East China Sea (ECS) and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (the "Islands"). The other is the Japanese-Soviet/Russian conflict over the Northern Territories (the "Territories"). 5 The former merits attention because high economic interdependence correlates with a compromise, admittedly a modest one. The latter merits attention because Japan has long attempted to use economic incentives to recover the Territories. 6 Incentives, however, have clearly failed. This work strongly calls into question the potential for economics to resolve or guarantee stability in the Dokdo quarrel. With respect to the ECS and Islands disputes, this research suggests that economics did not drive the 2008 ECS settlement, solved no part of the Islands dispute, and, in fact, was more often a source of friction than cooperation. In the case of the Territories, Japanese economic incentives failed to push the Soviet Union/Russia to compromise. This contribution incontrovertibly shows that we must pay attention to political factors to understand the potential for economic forces to serve as a palliative and to identify the factors that facilitate/hinder a settlement of territorial and maritime disputes. The policy ramifications of this are tackled below.
